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CRIMINAL LAW
I. PROBABLE CAUSE SUPPORTED BY AFFIDAVIT; DOUBLE
JEOPARDY AVOIDED BY ISSUANCE OF CONCURRENT SENTENCES
In State v. Pressley1 the South Carolina Supreme Court ex-
amined two significant issues. On the first issue, the court ruled
that a briefly worded affidavit could provide the showing of
probable cause necessary to justify issuance of a search warrant.
The second issue was whether the defendant's convictions of
both armed robbery and the lesser included offense of grand lar-
ceny violated his constitutional right against double jeopardy.
The court stated that because the sentences ran concurrently,
any error was harmless; therefore, the court did not review the
conviction.3
The trial court convicted Pressley of armed robbery, house-
breaking, and grand larceny.4 The trial judge imposed a sealed
sentence of twenty-five years imprisonment for the armed rob-
bery to run concurrently with ten years imprisonment for grand
larceny and consecutively with ten years imprisonment for
housebreaking.5 Pressley had been burglarizing a house when
the owners came home. He robbed them at gunpoint and es-
caped in their car. When arrested, Pressley confessed to commit-
ting the crimes.6
On appeal Pressley alleged that the trial judge erred by ad-
mitting into evidence a shirt that Pressley wore when commit-
ting the crimes. The defendant argued that the warrant under
which the shirt was seized was not supported by probable
cause. 7 In upholding the warrant, the court relied on the United
States Supreme Court case Illinois v. Gates.8 The court stated
1. 288 S.C. 128, 341 S.E.2d 626 (1986).
2. Id. at 131, 341 S.E.2d at 628.
3. Id. at 132, 341 S.E.2d at 628.
4. Id. at 129, 341 S.E.2d at 627.
5. Record at 11.
6. 288 S.C. at 130, 341 S.E.2d at 627.
7. Id.
8. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
1
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that the reviewing court's responsibility is to determine whether
the "magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that prob-
able cause existed."" Relying on Gates, the court stated that a
magistrate must examine the totality of the circumstances
stated in the affidavit to determine if there is probable cause to
issue the warrant. Moreover, the magistrate must be neutral and
detached.1" The court viewed the "entire record" and held that
the magistrate in this situation "had a substantial basis for con-
cluding that probable cause existed to authorize a search of the
home" listed in the affidavit." The court decided, therefore, that
the shirt "was properly admitted into evidence."' 2
Despite this conclusion, support in the affidavit for the mag-
istrate's finding of probable cause was weak.13 The affidavit
stated that the items it listed "were believed to be in the posses-
sion of Steve Pressley and that Steve Pressley did take these
items into this residence."' 4 Nothing in the affidavit stated who
believed that Pressley had the items, nor did the affidavit state
any basis for this belief. The United States Supreme Court has
determined that "[s]ufficient information must be presented to
the magistrate to allow that official to determine probable cause;
his action cannot be a mere ratification of the bare conclusions
of others."' 5 In the affidavit at issue no connection existed be-
tween the statement that an informant saw Pressley "coming
out of Sonny Boy McKenzie's residence" on the same morning
9. 288 S.C. at 131, 341 S.E.2d at 628.
10. Id. at 130-31, 341 S.E.2d at 627-28.
11. Id. at 131, 341 S.E.2d at 628.
12. Id.
13. The affidavit stated the following:
DESCRIPTION OF PROPERTY SOUGHT
Is one hundred dollar bills, one small caliber pistol, one pair of tennis shoes
with a pony on the side, one 50.00 dollar bill, one brown bag with handles, one
dark colored gym suit.
DESCRIPTION OF PREMISES... TO BE SEARCHED
These items were believed to be in the possession of Steve Pressley and that
Steve Pressley did take these items into this residence. A reliable informant
that on previous occasions had given the Police Dept. information that has led
to the arrest and conviction of person in the past, states that he saw Steve
Pressley coming out of Sonny Boy McKenzie's residence the morning of July 2,
1984 at about 10:00 a.m. The residence to be searched is the residence of 1323
Center St., Kingstree, S.C.
Record at 59.
14. Id.
15. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 293 (1983).
[Vol. 39
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as the robbery of the Halls' residence and the theft of certain
items from the Halls' residence. Arguably, this affidavit con-
tained insufficient information to allow the magistrate to find
probable cause; therefore, his issuance of the search warrant
may have been a "mere ratification"16 of the affiant policeman's
belief.
In addition, the magistrate may not have acted in a neutral
and detached manner. United States v. Leon established that an
issuing magistrate must be neutral and detached, and not
"merely . ..a rubber stamp for the police."17 By issuing the
warrant on the basis of the affiant officer's belief, the magistrate
in Pressley may have acted as a part of the police team, thus
abandoning his neutral and detached role. Arguably, this magis-
trate properly could have found sufficient probable cause only if
the applying officer had supplemented his affidavit with im-
proper oral testimony. The South Carolina Supreme Court ruled
in State v. York 8 that "sufficient facts [must] be stated in the
affidavit to form the basis of a judgment by the issuing officer
that probable cause exists." 19 Therefore, even if the officer in
Pressley did supplement his affidavit with oral statements, this
procedure was improper because the oral statements were not in
the affidavit.
The finding in Pressley that sufficient probable cause ex-
isted to support issuance of the search warrant may doom simi-
lar fourth amendment claims in the future simply because a
magistrate signed the challenged warrant. In Stone v. Powell
20
the United States Supreme Court held that when a state has
provided a full and fair hearing in litigation on all fourth
16. Id.
17. 468 U.S. 897, 914 (1984).
18. 250 S.C. 30, 156 S.E.2d 326 (1967).
19. Id. at 34, 156 S.E.2d at 327 (emphasis added). York stated the following:
"The affidavit, therefore, did not disclose anything which the issuing officer
could consider in arriving at a determination of whether there was probable
cause for the issuance of the warrant, which, in effect, left the determination of
probable cause to the judgment and discretion of the police officer, rather than
to the issuing officer. Under these circumstances, we think it clear that the
affidavit was totally insufficient and the warrant issued thereupon was a
nullity."
Id. at 35, 156 S.E.2d at 328 (quoting State v. Hill, 245 S.C. 76, 82, 138 S.E.2d 829, 831
(1964)).
20. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
1987]
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amendment claims, the federal courts will not provide a collat-
eral habeas corpus review of the state court findings.2 1 If the
standard of review in Pressley satisfies the full and fair hearing
requirement on a search and seizure claim, future fourth amend-
ment claims in South Carolina not only will face dim prospects
of success in the state forum, but also will be denied collateral
relief in the federal courts.
The other significant ruling in Pressley involved the defend-
ant's convictions of both armed robbery and grand larceny. Al-
though the court granted the State permission to argue against
the established precedent of State v. Lawson,22 the court found
it unnecessary in Pressley to determine if the grand larceny in
this case was a lesser included offense of armed robbery. The
court held that even if it were a lesser included offense, any er-
ror due to the double conviction was harmless because the
sentences ran concurrently.23
The court in Pressley relied upon Roviaro v. United
States,2' in which the Supreme Court applied the concurrent
sentence doctrine. In Benton v. Maryland the Supreme Court
interpreted this doctrine "to indicate that the existence of a
valid concurrent sentence removes the necessary elements of a
justiciable controversy. '25 The Benton court, however, held that
21. Id. at 493-94.
22. 279 S.C. 266, 268, 305 S.E.2d 249, 250 (1983). The court held that grand larceny
is a lesser included offense of robbery, and that when the same act gives rise to both
offenses, convictions of both offenses violate the defendant's constitutional right against
double jeopardy.
23. 288 S.C. at 132, 341 S.E.2d at 628 (citing Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53
(1957)). The proposition for which the Pressley court cited Roviaro is contained in a
footnote to the Roviaro case. The Roviaro footnote explains that when a defendant re-
ceives multiple convictions and the sentences run concurrently, if "the concurrent sen-
tence [does] not exceed that which lawfully might be imposed under a single count, the
judgment may be affirmed if the conviction on either count is valid." 353 U.S. at 59 n.6.
In so stating, the Roviaro court relied on several cases, including Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81, 85 (1943) and Claassen v. United States, 142 U.S. 140, 146-47 (1891).
24. 353 U.S. 53. Though Roviaro did not expressly state this rule to be the concur-
rent sentence doctrine, other cases have so termed it. See generally Benton v. Maryland,
395 U.S. 784, 788 (1969).
25. 395 U.S. 784, 788 (1969). In Benton the defendant previously had been tried in
state court and acquitted for larceny but convicted of burglary. Before the defendant's
appeal, the Maryland court held unconstitutional a section of the state constitution that
required jurors to swear their belief in God. The Benton court, therefore, remanded the
defendant's case for a new trial. At the second trial the defendant was convicted of both
offenses. The sentences for the convictions ran concurrently. On appeal the United
4
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this doctrine does not state a jurisdictional rule, and more im-
portantly, that "the existence of concurrent sentences does not
remove the elements necessary to create a justiciable case.
'26
Benton held that if a court does not review all of the convic-
tions, the defendant may be subjected to adverse collateral ef-
fects. A few states, for example, examine all convictions when
enhancing a sentence under habitual offender statutes, "even if
the convictions actually constituted only separate counts in a
single indictment tried on the same day. '27 Moreover, these con-
victions might adversely affect a defendant's chances for em-
ployment or parole, 28 and both convictions may be used against
the defendant to impeach his testimony in a future trial.29
Other policy considerations are invoked in the trial process
itself when a defendant is subjected to multiple charges for the
same offense. In his concurring opinion in Ball v. United
States,30 Justice Stevens stated that when the court subjects a
defendant to multiple charges, this defendant is "'put in jeop-
ardy' as to each charge. To retain his freedom, the defendant
must obtain an acquittal on all charges; to put the defendant in
prison, the prosecution need only obtain a single guilty ver-
dict."3 1 Further, when the evidence of the prosecution is weak,
"its ability to bring multiple charges may substantially enhance
the possibility that, even though innocent, the defendant may be
found guilty on one or more charges as a result of a compromise
verdict.
3 2
States Supreme Court overturned the defendant's larceny conviction and vacated the
judgment because the rule of double jeopardy, that a state may not put a defendant in
jeopardy twice for the same offense, prohibits a second trial following an acquittal on the
same offense. The court explained, but did not apply the concurrent sentence doctrine.
395 U.S. at 796-97, 798.
26. Id. at 790 (emphasis added).
27. Id. This view, however, is a minority rule. The majority rule is that multiple
convictions handed down at the same time are treated as a single conviction for the
purpose of habitual criminal statutes. Id. at 790 n.6. Even though this rule is the minor-
ity view, double jeopardy problems arise when the convicted person is in one of the mi-
nority states and his multiple convictions all count against him in sentencing
enhancement.
28. United States v. Hooper, 432 F.2d 604, 605 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
29. 395 U.S. at 791.
30. 470 U.S. 856 (1985).
31. Id. at 867 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359,
371-72 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
32. 470 U.S. at 868 (Stevens, J., concurring).
1987]
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The Supreme Court held in Ball that because the defend-
ant's concurrent sentences involved a single indictment, the dis-
trict court had to vacate one of the convictions.3 Further, the
courts of appeals in at least four federal circuits direct that a
court must vacate the concurrent sentence for the lesser in-
cluded offense when the defendant also is convicted of the more
serious offense. 4 In analyzing the Benton decision, the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals stated that Benton requires a reevalua-
tion of the concurrent sentence doctrine. 5 Though no South
Carolina case other than Pressley has addressed the issue, these
federal cases suggest that when a defendant, as in Pressley, is
convicted of both a lesser included and a more serious offense,
he may be harmed by future collateral effects from both
sentences. The majority rule appears to be that a court must
review both sentences and vacate the sentence for the lesser in-
cluded offense, even when the sentences run concurrently, to
avoid violating the defendant's right against double jeopardy.
Whether Pressley's sentence for grand larceny would be vacated
under this majority view depends on whether his convictions of
armed robbery and grand larceny were based on the same act.
Since the court in Pressley, in upholding the convictions, as-
sumed arguendo that the charge of grand larceny was a lesser
included offense of the armed robbery charge, the court did not
address whether grand larceny is a lesser included offense of
armed robbery.
The court's decision in Pressley that the search warrant was
supported by probable cause in the affidavit seemingly implies
that the fourth amendment in South Carolina only requires that
a magistrate sign the warrant. Under the tests of Leon and
Gates, however, the affidavit in Pressley arguably was insuffi-
cient for the determination of probable cause. Moreover, issuing
Pressley concurrent sentences on the armed robbery and grand
larceny convictions, if the grand larceny conviction was a lesser
included offense of the armed robbery conviction, could subject
33. Id. at 865.
34. United States v. Belt, 516 F.2d 873, 875 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1056 (1976); United States v. Tanner, 471 F.2d 128, 140 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
949 (1972); United States v. Hooper, 432 F.2d 604, 606 (D.C. Cir. 1970); United States v.
Heard, 420 F.2d 628, 631 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1016 (1970); Audett v.
United States, 265 F.2d 837, 848 (9th Cir. 1959).
35. 471 F.2d at 140.
[Vol. 39
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Pressley to adverse collateral effects. The court's finding that
the double conviction did not violate Pressley's double jeopardy
right places South Carolina in the minority on this issue.
Janet C. Brooks
II. TEST EXPANDED FOR WHEN PREVIOUS TRIAL FOR LESSER
OFFENSE INVOKES DOUBLE JEOPARDY BAR TO LATER
PROSECUTION
In State v. Grampus36 the South Carolina Supreme Court
adopted an expanded test for determining when conviction of a
lesser offense becomes a bar on double jeopardy grounds to sub-
sequent prosecution for a greater offense. Under the revised test,
a defendant's right to be free from double jeopardy is violated
when the prosecution of a related crime at a second trial will
rely on proof of the same set of facts which served as the basis of
a prior conviction. In Grampus, when the State attempted to
prove the offense of "felony while driving under the influence"
(felony D.U.I.)37 with proof of a traffic violation for which the
defendant had already been convicted in magistrate's court,
double jeopardy barred the felony D.U.I. prosecution."
Larry Grampus had been drinking and was driving alone on
a rainy night on a straight stretch of highway. His car left the
northbound lane and entered the southbound lane. He side-
swiped a car and continued three hundred feet until he hit a
truck head-on. A ten-year-old child was killed." Police on the
scene issued, inter alia, a traffic citation for improper use of
lanes. Grampus was later indicted for felony D.U.I. and defense
counsel suggested to the solicitor's office that the traffic citation
not be pursued separately. Nevertheless, the magistrate's court
tried and convicted Grampus, in absentia, of improper use of
36. 288 S.C. 395, 343 S.E.2d 26 (1986).
37. Felony driving under the influence requires proof of the following three ele-
ments: "(1) the actor drives a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs;
(2) the actor does an act forbidden by law or neglects a duty imposed by law; and (3) the
act or neglect proximately causes great bodily injury or death to another person." 288
S.C. at 397, 343 S.E.2d at 27 (emphasis added) (construing S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-2945
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1985)).
38. 288 S.C. at 397 n.4, 343 S.E.2d at 27 n.4.
39. Brief of Respondent at 1-3.
1987]
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lanes.40 Subsequently, the circuit court convicted him of felony
D.U.I.-Il
On appeal Grampus contended that the felony D.U.I. con-
viction, imposed after the earlier conviction on the lesser of-
fense, violated his constitutional protection against double jeop-
ardy. The court agreed and reversed his conviction.42 The
controlling test was whether the prosecution relied on the im-
proper use of lanes violation to establish an element of the fel-
ony D.U.I. offense. The court concluded that evidence of the
lane-change violation had been the sole basis for establishing
"an act forbidden by law," a necessary element of the felony
D.U.I. statute.
43
The South Carolina Supreme Court relied exclusively on Il-
linois v. Vitale," a United States Supreme Court decision, in
requiring that the felony D.U.I. conviction be vacated on
grounds of double jeopardy. The double jeopardy clause of the
fifth amendment of the United States Constitution provides that
no person "shall be subject for the same offense to be twice put
in jeopardy of life or limb."145 This constitutional guarantee has
been held to consist of three separate protections: "It protects
against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal.
It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense af-
ter conviction. And it protects against multiple punishments for
40. While the record is devoid of reference to the statutory provision relied upon, it
can be inferred that the citation was based on S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-1810 (Law Co-op.
Supp. 1984), which provides that all motor vehicles shall be driven in the right half of
the roadway. Brief of Respondent at 5.
41. 288 S.C. at 396, 343 S.E.2d at 26.
42. Id.
43. Id., 343 S.E.2d at 27.
44. 447 U.S. 410 (1980).
45. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Recognizing that the double jeopardy prohibition "rep-
resents a fundamental ideal in our constitutional heritage," the Supreme Court has held
the double jeopardy clause applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment.
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969). The South Carolina Constitution provides
the same guarantee. S.C. CONST. art. I, § 12. The ban on double jeopardy is based on the
following principle:
[T]he State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make
repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby sub-
jecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live
in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possi-
bility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957).
[Vol. 39
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the same offense." '46 In both Grampus and Vitale the second of
these double jeopardy protections was implicated.
The long-standing test for determining whether two offenses
are sufficiently "the same" to trigger the double jeopardy protec-
tions was set forth in Blockburger v. United States.47 "[T]he ap-
plicable rule is that, where the same act or transaction consti-
tutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to
be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only
one is whether each provision requires proof of an additional
fact which the other does not."48 Under the Blockburger test the
court must examine the statutory elements of the two crimes. If
each crime requires proof of a fact that the other does not, the
offenses are not the same, and the subsequent prosecution is not
barred. If every element of one crime is also an element of the
related crime, however, multiple prosecutions are prohibited.
Application of the Blockburger test in a case concerning se-
quential prosecution is illustrated by Brown v. Ohio,50 in which a
conviction for a "lesser-included offense" precluded later prose-
cution for a greater offense. Brown was convicted of joyriding
under one statute and was later convicted of stealing the same
motor vehicle under another statute. The Court held that every
element of the joyriding offense was also an element of the crime
of auto theft and that to prove auto theft, only the additional
element of intent to deprive the owner of possession had to be
established.51
A more complex problem of determining whether two of-
fenses are the same is presented by the facts of both Vitale and
Grampus. In Vitale the crime of manslaughter by automobile
could have been predicated on any number of unlawful acts and
did not necessarily entail proof of the earlier conviction for fail-
ure to reduce speed. The case had not been tried; therefore,
"[t]he mere possibility that the State [would] seek to rely on all
46. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969)(footnotes omitted).
47. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
48. Id. at 304. The Blockburger test was originally used to determine whether two
offenses were the same for the purpose of prohibiting multiple punishments. The test
was adopted by the South Carolina courts in State v. Lawrence, 266 S.C. 423, 426, 223
S.E.2d 856, 858 (1976).
49. lannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 785 n.17 (1975).
50. 432 U.S. 161 (1977).
51. Id. at 167-68.
1987]
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of the ingredients necessarily included in the traffic offense to
establish an element of its manslaughter case would not be suffi-
cient to bar the [later] prosecution."52
The question of whether the subsequent prosecution would
indeed be barred was not settled in Vitale. The Court, remand-
ing the case for trial, directed that "if in the pending man-
slaughter prosecution Illinois relies on and proves a failure to
slow to avoid an accident as the reckless act necessary to prove
manslaughter, Vitale would have a substantial claim of double
jeopardy.11 3 The four dissenting Justices were critical of the
equivocal majority position and pointed out that a defendant
should be entitled to a determination of his double jeopardy
claim prior to being subjected to a second trial.54
In Grampus the felony D.U.I. statute at issue required the
commission of "an act forbidden by law."' 55 The unlawful act
could be satisfied by a number of traffic violations of which im-
proper use of lanes was only one. Because the statute did not
require proof specifically of improper use of lanes, this lesser of-
fense was not technically a "lesser-included offense" and did not
satisfy the Brown version of the Blockburger test. Under the
traditional statutory elements test, therefore, the subsequent
prosecution for felony D.U.I. would not be barred even though
the State intended to rely on improper use of lanes to prove fel-
ony D.U.I. at trial.
The South Carolina Supreme Court in Grampus took the
further step suggested by Vitale by holding that the felony
D.U.I. prosecution was barred by double jeopardy because
Grampus previously had been convicted of improper use of
lanes. In so holding, the court broadened the scope of what may
constitute the "same offense" for double jeopardy purposes. The
court shifted the focus of the analysis from the elements of the
statutes to an examination of the legal theories underlying the
two prosecutions and the actual evidence to be relied upon at
52. Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 419 (1980).
53. Id. at 421 (emphasis added); see also Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682
(1977)(although other felonies could underlie a felony-murder prosecution, the subse-
quent robbery prosecution was barred because it was used as the necessary felony in the
earlier felony-murder conviction).
54. 447 U.S. at 426 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
55. 288 S.C. at 397, 343 S.E.2d at 27.
[Vol. 39
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trial. 6
Furthermore, the South Carolina court created a solution to
the dilemma raised by the dissent in Vitale. The court man-
dated that the indictment "state with particularity the 'act for-
bidden by law or. . . duty imposed by law' which will be relied
on by the state to support the felony D.U.I. charge. ' 57 There-
fore, unlike the Vitale result, the issue of whether evidence of
the lesser offense will be relied on for prosecution of the greater
offense should be apparent on the face of the indictment.58 Pre-
sumably, under this requirement the determination of a defend-
ant's double jeopardy claim prior to his being subjected to re-
trial would be possible.
In a footnote59 the Grampus court indicated that its opinion
effectively overruled State v. Butler.e0 In Butler the court deter-
mined the statute prohibiting double jeopardy to be inapplicable
because "it was never intended that an acquittal or conviction of
a minor offense included in a greater offense would bar prosecu-
tion for the latter, if the court in which the acquittal or convic-
tion was had was without jurisdiction."'61 The implication of this
ruling is that the State may no longer rely on the jurisdictional
56. Id.; see also Jordan v. Virginia, 653 F.2d 870 (4th Cir. 1981) (defendant's rights
under the double jeopardy clause were violated because the evidence used by the State
in prosecuting an earlier misdemeanor conviction for obtaining a controlled substance
with a forged prescription would be sufficient to sustain the later felony conviction for
possession of the same substance). For a discussion of the "actual evidence" and other
approaches for determining when related offenses are the "same offense" for double
jeopardy purposes, see Comment, Double Jeopardy-Prosecution of Related Offenses in
Separate Trials, 32 S.C.L. REv. 589 (1981).
57. 288 S.C. at 397 n.2, 343 S.E.2d at 27 n.2 (interpreting S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-
2945 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1985)).
58. See, People v. Zegart, 83 Il. 2d 440, 415 N.E.2d 341 (1980), cert. denied, 452
U.S. 948 (1981). See generally W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 17.4
(1984).
59. 288 S.C. at 395 n.3, 343 S.E.2d at 27 n.3.
60. 230 S.C. 159, 94 S.E.2d 761 (1956).
61. Id. at 160, 94 S.E.2d at 762 (1956). Since Butler conceded that the two offenses
were separate, he did not invoke the constitutional protection against double jeopardy
for the same offense. Id. See generally S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-23-20 (Law. Co-op. 1976),
which provides as follows:
Whenever a municipal court or a magistrate's court shall have acquired juris-
diction by reason of a person committing an act which is alleged to be in viola-
tion of a municipal ordinance and which is in violation of the criminal law of
this State a conviction or an acquittal by the first court acquiring jurisdiction
shall be a complete bar to a trial by another court for the same alleged unlaw-
ful act or acts.
11
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exception of Butler. In the future the prosecution will be re-
quired to join lesser offenses that will be relied on at trial with
the greater offenses in courts of general jurisdiction.2
While the Grampus decision provides somewhat greater
protection for defendants against being subjected to double
jeopardy for related crimes, the implications should not be con-
strued too broadly. In a later case, State v. Carter,63 the court
clarified the legal consequences of Grampus. The court stipu-
lated that "a single criminal transaction may constitute multiple
distinct offenses for which one may be severally punishable.
'6 4
For example, Grampus could have been convicted of both im-
proper use of lanes and felony D.U.I. at a single trial. Further-
more, the Grampus and Carter holdings do not foreclose multi-
ple trials for distinct offenses arising out of a single incident
when the same facts adjudicated at the first trial are not neces-
sary to prove the crime at the subsequent trial.
Janis Y. Dickman
III. RETROACTIVE EFFECT OF LATER CASES IN COLLATERAL
PROCEEDINGS CLARIFIED
In Yates v. Aiken"' the South Carolina Supreme Court de-
termined that when a new rule of criminal law is announced it
generally will have retroactive effect only for cases pending on
direct appeal. Adopting the approach of Justice Harlan, the
court held that a new rule will not apply to collateral attacks
unless the court decides that jurisdiction in the particular type
of case is improper or that defendants in such cases are not sub-
62. Although not cited as authority by the court, this ruling may be required by
the South Carolina Constitution which establishes a unified judicial system. S.C. CONST.
art. V, § 1; see Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970)(identical language in the Florida
Constitution establishing a unified judicial system requires that double jeopardy protec-
tion prohibit multiple trials for offenses that are the "same" even when the first court
lacked jurisdiction over the greater offense).
63. 291 S.C. 385, 353 S.E.2d 875 (1987) (reckless homicide prosecution violated de-
fendant's right to be free from double jeopardy because prosecution was founded on the
same facts which served as the basis for prior conviction for driving under the influence).
64. Id. at 388, 353 S.E.2d at 876 (citing State v. Norton, 286 S.C. 95, 332 S.E.2d
531 (1985)).
65. 290 S.C. 231, 349 S.E.2d 84 (1986), cert. granted, - U.S. --, 107 S. Ct. 1601
(1987). The United States Supreme Court's decision to review again Yates v. Aiken may
indicate that Court's continued interest in the retroactivity of new criminal law.
[Vol. 39
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ject to criminal sanction.6 This decision followed and expanded
upon the court's previous ruling in McClary v. State.6 7
Yates and an accomplice held up a store in rural Greenville
county in 1981.68 During the commission of the crime Yates shot
the manager of the store, Willie Wood, wounding him in the
hand and chest but not killing him. Yates' accomplice killed
Wood's mother by stabbing her with a knife. Since South Caro-
lina imputes the guilt of an accomplice to one who commits a
crime,"' Yates was convicted of both armed robbery and murder
and given the death penalty.
The case came before the South Carolina Supreme Court on
remand from the United States Supreme Court for evaluation of
the jury instructions at Yates' original trial.7 0 The judge in the
original trial had instructed the jury that malice was to be pre-
sumed from the use of a deadly weapon. 1 Because cases coming
after Yates' conviction held that such an instruction creates an
impermissible mandatory presumption of guilt, 2 Yates chal-
lenged the jury instruction in a petition to the South Carolina
Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus. The court summarily
dismissed the petition, but the United States Supreme Court re-
manded for reconsideration in light of Francis v. Franklin, a
1985 case in which the Supreme Court prohibited the use of
mandatory presumptions.
The primary issue73 on remand was whether new rules of
66. Id. at 236, 349 S.E.2d at 86.
67. 287 S.C. 160, 337 S.E.2d 218 (1985)(holding that the retroactive effect of State
v. Elmore, 279 S.C. 417, 308 S.E.2d 781 (1983), would be limited to cases pending on
direct appeal).
68. The facts of the case are described in 290 S.C. at 237, 349 S.E.2d at 87, and in
State v. Yates, 280 S.C. 29, 310 S.E.2d 805 (1982), cert. denied sub nom. Yates v. South
Carolina, 462 U.S. 1124 (1983).
69. "Yates was found guilty of the murder of Mrs. Wood under the theory of 'hand
of one, hand of all.' When two or more persons aid, abet and encourage each other in the
commission of a crime, all being present, each is guilty as a principal." 290 S.C. at 237,
349 S.E.2d at 87 (quoting State v. Hicks, 257 S.C. 279, 185 S.E.2d 746 (1971)).
70. Yates v. Aiken, - U.S. -, 106 S. Ct. 218 (1985).
71. 290 S.C. at 233-34, 349 S.E.2d at 85.
72. Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985); State v. Elmore, 279 S.C. 417, 308
S.E.2d 781 (1983).
73. A secondary issue in Yates, raised sua sponte, was whether Yates' death pen-
alty was acceptable under the eighth amendment and Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782
(1982). 290 S.C. at 236, 349 S.E.2d at 86. In Enmund the court forbade imposition of the
death penalty for one "who aids and abets a felony in the course of which a murder is
committed by others but who does not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a
19871
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criminal law applied retroactively to cases awaiting collateral re-
view.7 4 Beginning with the proposition that "'[r]etroactive ap-
plication is not compelled, constitutionally or otherwise,' ,,75 the
court distilled the "mass of confusion" it found in Supreme
Court cases on the topic to fashion a rule for state court deci-
sions. 76 At both ends of the spectrum, Supreme Court cases of-
fered bright line rules that the court readily accepted. At one
extreme, cases constituting a "clear break ' 77 with prior authority
had not been given retroactive application to cases awaiting ei-
ther direct or collateral review.718 In contrast, "when a ruling est-
ablishe[d] that the trial court's action [was] void ab initio or
that defendant's conduct was not subject to criminal punish-
ment," the new ruling had been given retroactive effect even for
cases awaiting collateral review.79 When a new rule of law fit
neither of these categories, however, courts struggled with the
question of retroactive effect, and the case law was "'almost as
difficult to follow as the tracks made by a beast of prey in search
of its intended victim.' ,s
Sorting through this confusion, the court adopted the ap-
proach espoused by Justice Harlan"' and held that when a sub-
killing take place or that lethal force will be employed." 458 U.S. at 797. Since Yates
shot Wood in the chest the court had "little difficulty in finding that Yates attempted to
kill and intended that life be taken," 290 S.C. at 238, 349 S.E.2d at 87, so the court
upheld his death sentence.
74. See generally Annotation, Prospective or Retroactive Operation of Overruling
Decision, 10 A.L.R.3D 1371 (1966); Annotation, United States Supreme Court's Views as
to Retroactive Effect of Its Own Decisions Announcing New Rules, 65 L. ED. 2d 1219
(1981).
75. 290 S.C. at 234, 349 S.E.2d at 85 (quoting Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 642
(1984)); see also Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965)(full retroactive effect for ex-
clusionary rule of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), not constitutionally mandated).
76. 290 S.C. at 234, 349 S.E.2d at 85.
77. The requirement of a "clear break" has been described as "a clear break with
the past," Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 248 (1969); as "a sharp break in the web
of the law," Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 381 n.2 (1972)(Stewart, J., dissenting);
and, in the civil context, as the establishment of "a new principle of law, either by over-
ruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied or by deciding an issue of
first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed." Chevron Oil Co. v. Hu-
son, 404 U.S. 97, 106 (1971)(citation omitted).
78. 290 S.C. at 235, 349 S.E.2d at 85-86.
79. Id., 349 S.E.2d at 86 (citing United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 550
(1982)).
80. Id. at 234, 349 S.E.2d at 85 (quoting 457 U.S. at 544).
81. See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667 (1971)(Harlan, J., concurring); De-
sist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also 457 U.S. 547
14
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sequent ruling fit neither of the bright line tests, the new rule of
law should apply only to cases pending on direct appeal.82 The
court stated:
[T]he Harlan approach avoids the problem of the Court be-
coming a "super-legislature," picking one case at random in
which to announce a new rule, "then letting all other similarly
situated persons be passed by unaffected and unprotected by
the new rule." On the other hand, it prevents the illogical re-
sult of reversing, on collateral review, a decision on the basis of
a rule of law which did not exist at the time the case was fi-
nally decided.
3
The court also stated:
"The distinction [drawn between cases pending on direct or
collateral review] properly rests on considerations of finality in
the judicial process. The one litigant already has taken his case
through the primary system. The other has not. For the latter,
the curtain of finality has not been drawn. Somewhere, the
closing must come.1
8 4
The court's decision to draw this "curtain of finality" and to
deny retroactive effect to cases pending collateral review is sub-
ject to criticism. As indicated above, other courts have seen fit to
apply new rules of law to both wider 5 and narrower 6 circles of
pending cases. Justice Finney, in dissent, argued that no distinc-
tion should be made between direct and collateral review "in
cases where the alleged error affects the truth-finding function
and particularly in those cases where the State seeks the ulti-
(summarizing the Harlan position).
82. 290 S.C. at 236, 349 S.E.2d at 86.
83. Id. at 235, 349 S.E.2d at 86 (quoting Shea v. Louisiana, 470 U.S. 51, 56 (1985))
(citation omitted).
84. Id., 349 S.E.2d at 86 (quoting 470 U.S. at 59-60). But see Johnson v. New
Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966)(rejecting distinction between cases pending on direct review
and those pending collateral review).
85. See, e.g., Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505 (1973)(double jeopardy rule of Waller
v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970), fully retroactive); Arsenault v. Massachusetts, 393 U.S. 5
(1968)(rule of White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963), regarding right to counsel at pre-
liminary hearing, retroactive to petition for post conviction relief).
86. See, e.g., Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969)(electronic surveillance
rule of Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), "wholly prospective"); Stovall v.
Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967)(exclusionary rule of United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218
(1967), and Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), not applicable to cases in which
the improper police conduct occurred prior to the decisions in those cases).
1987]
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mate punishment. 's7 His opinion is supported by dictum in
United States v. Johnson,"' a case upon which the majority re-
lied heavily. The Johnson decision recognized that "the Court
has regularly given complete retroactive effect to new constitu-
tional rules whose major purpose 'is to overcome an aspect of
the criminal trial that substantially impairs its truth-finding
function and so raises serious questions about the accuracy of
guilty verdicts in past trials.' ,9 Allowing the jury in Yates to
reach its decision by way of an impermissible presumption
clearly affected the jury's role as "truth-finder." The South Car-
olina Supreme Court, however, without directly addressing this
aspect of the case, denied retroactive effect to the Franklin rule
and held instead that full retroactivity would apply only in those
cases that were void ab initio or when the defendant's conduct
was not subject to criminal prosecution.
Any position taken on the issue is subject to criticism. The
court recognized as much itself, stating that "[e]ven under our
view . . . it may be inevitable that some similarly situated de-
fendants will be treated differently."9 The court's decision, if
imperfect, is a reasonable balancing of demands for judicial
economy and fairness to defendants. It is supported by United
States 1 and South Carolina Supreme Court92 precedent and is
probably, as the court stated, "less likely to result in inequitable
treatment among similarly situated individuals" than other
87. 290 S.C. at 238, 349 S.E.2d at 88 (Finney, J., dissenting). Justice Finney's dis-
sent also emphasized that the doctrine of Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985), was
not a "clear break" with prior law due to the previous case of Sandstrom v. Montana,
442 U.S. 510 (1979). This analysis is correct, but perhaps misleading. The implication is
that the court in the instant case should apply Francis (or its South Carolina counter-
part, State v. Elmore, 279 S.C. 417, 308 S.E.2d 781 (1983)) retroactively to cases pending
collateral review. The "clear break" doctrine does not go so far. It merely mandates pro-
spective application when there is a clear break. See Desist v. United States, 394 U.S.
244 (1969). In Yates there was no clear break with prior law, and the court implicitly
acknowledged as much in its application of the Harlan approach. 290 S.C. at 235, 349
S.E.2d at 86 (Harlan rule not addressed to cases involving clear breaks from prior law).
It does not follow, however, that the court must apply the rule retroactively simply be-
cause prospective application was not mandated.
88. 457 U.S. 537 (1982).
89. Id. at 544 (1982)(quoting Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 653 (1971)).
90. 290 S.C. at 236, 349 S.E.2d at 86.
91. See 457 U.S. 537 (1982).
92. McClary v. State, 287 S.C. 160, 337 S.E.2d 218 (1985).
[Vol. 39
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available approaches.9"
In summary, the court in Yates v. Aiken adopted Justice
Harlan's approach to the issue of retroactivity and held that
when a new rule of criminal law does not constitute a clear break
with past authority, it will have retroactive effect, but only upon
cases pending on direct appeal. Retroactive application of the
rule to cases under collateral review will be appropriate only if
the new rule establishes that jurisdiction is improper or that the
defendant's conduct is not subject to criminal sanction. The
court failed to address whether the effect of impermissible pre-
sumptions on the truth-finding function should require retroac-
tive application of a new rule of criminal law. As indicated
above, however, the court was not obligated, "constitutionally or
otherwise," to grant any retroactive effect. The decision was
therefore within the discretion of the court, was supported by
ample precedent, and clarified an area of the law typically mud-
dled with uncertainty.
John A. Cottingham
IV. WITHDRAWN GUILTY PLEA NOT ADMISSIBLE IN LATER TRIAL
In State v. Mathis9 4 the South Carolina Supreme Court
held that a withdrawn guilty plea is not admissible for any pur-
pose in a later trial. 5 In holding evidence of the prior plea inad-
missible, the court adopted a rule grounded in policy considera-
tions and accepted by the majority of state96 and federal
courts.
9 7
93. 290 S.C. at 236, 349 S.E.2d at 86.
94. 287 S.C. 589, 340 S.E.2d 538 (1986).
95. Id. at 592-93, 340 S.E.2d at 540. The court found the inadmissibility of the
withdrawn guilty plea dispositive. The court, however, also addressed two other issues
that are not discussed in the text of this article. First, the court held that testimony by
the six-year-old prosecutrix that defendant had touched her with his penis and that it
had hurt her was evidence of "some intrusion, however slight," S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-
651(h) (Law. Co-op. 1976), and that the trial judge properly refused to direct a verdict
for defendant on the question of intrusion. Second, the court held as error the trial
court's refusal to charge the lesser included offense of assault and battery of a high and
aggravated nature when it submitted the charge of first degree criminal sexual conduct
to the jury.
96. See Annotation, Propriety and Prejudicial Effect of Showing, in Criminal
Case, Withdrawn Guilty Plea, 86 A.LR.2D 326 (1962).
97. See Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220 (1927); see also FED. R. EVID. 410;
1987]
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Mathis was indicted for first degree criminal sexual conduct.
He initially pleaded not guilty, but later pleaded guilty to the
lesser charge of committing a lewd act upon a child under four-
teen years of age."8 The judge determined that the plea was vol-
untary and imposed a ten-year sentence.9 Upon hearing the
sentence, Mathis protested, proclaiming his innocence. 100 The
judge permitted him to withdraw the guilty plea e1' and to stand
trial for first degree criminal sexual conduct. At the jury trial
Mathis testified that he had never been alone with the girl in
question. 102 The solicitor impeached this testimony and ques-
tioned the defendant, over defense counsel's objection, about his
prior plea of guilty to the charge of committing a lewd act upon
the girl.10 3 Mathis admitted making the plea, and the judge in-
structed the jury to consider evidence of that plea for impeach-
ment purposes only.10 4 The jury then convicted Mathis of first
degree criminal sexual conduct.105 The supreme court held on
appeal that evidence of the prior guilty plea was so prejudicial
that its admission constituted reversible error. The court distin-
guished prior inconsistent statements (including confessions)
from guilty pleas. 06 In a previous decision the court had held
that mere inconsistent statements were admissible, 0 7 but in
Mathis the court determined that guilty pleas were qualitatively
different and accordingly were inadmissible. The court quoted
the United States Supreme Court as follows: "A plea of guilty
differs in purpose and effect from a mere admission or extrajudi-
cial confession; it is itself a conviction. Like a jury verdict it is
conclusive.' ' 0
Various state court rulings also influenced the court's deci-
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(6).
98, 287 S.C. at 590-91, 340 S.E.2d at 539.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 591, 340 S.E.2d at 539.
101. See generally Annotation, Right to Withdraw Plea of Guilty, 66 A.L.R. 628
(1930), supplementing 20 A.L.R. 1445 (1922).
102. Record at 93.
103. 287 S.C. at 591, 340 S.E.2d at 539-40.
104. Id., 340 S.E.2d at 540.
105. Id. at 590, 340 S.E.2d at 539.
106. Id. at 592, 340 S.E.2d at 540.
107. State v. Copeland, 278 S.C. 572, 300 S.E.2d 63 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S.
1103 (1983).
108. 287 S.C. at 592, 340 S.E.2d at 540 (quoting Kercheval v. United States, 374
U.S. 220 (1927)).
[Vol. 39
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sion. The supreme court cited cases from other jurisdictions for
the propositions that the admission of such evidence was "unfair
. [to] the accused after he ha[d] been allowed to retract it"; 109
that the admission undermined the presumption of innocence; 110
that it discouraged settlement of cases;11 that it made "the priv-
ilege of withdrawal . . . illusory";" 2 and that it could cause the
jury to act recklessly."' These authorities, plus "considerations
of basic fairness," 114 persuaded the court to exclude evidence of
prior guilty pleas for all purposes. 1 5
Although Mathis does present underlying constitutional
questions, most courts, including the South Carolina Supreme
Court, have found it unnecessary to delve into these ques-
tions." 6 The court's reliance on considerations of fairness,
117
however, implies that when Mathis' prior guilty plea was used
against him at trial, he was denied due process of law." 8 There
109. See People v. Spitaleri, 9 N.Y.2d 168, 173 N.E.2d 35, 212 N.Y.S.2d 53 (1961).
110. See State v. Joyner, 228 La. 927, 84 So. 2d 462 (1955). Neither the decision in
Joyner nor that in Mathis indicates how the introduction of probative or even prejudi-
cial evidence eliminates the presumption of innocence. The introduction of evidence does
not shift the burden of proof from the prosecution to the defense; it merely adds weight
to the prosecution's case.
111. See State v. Wright, 103 Ariz. 52, 436 P.2d 601 (1968).
112. See People v. Street, 288 Mich. 406, 284 N.W. 926 (1939).
113. See State v. Boone, 66 N.J. 38, 327 A.2d 661 (1974).
114. 287 S.C. at 593, 340 S.E.2d at 541.
115. Id. at 592-93, 340 S.E.2d at 540. In addition to conforming with the majority of
courts considering this admissibility question, the Mathis decision is also substantially
justified by the policy grounds that the court enumerated. The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals has stated:
[N]o defendant or his counsel will pursue. . .[candid plea negotiations] if the
remarks uttered . . . are to be admitted in evidence as proof of guilt. More-
over, it is inherently unfair for the government to engage in such an activity,
only to use it as a weapon against the defendant when negotiations fail.
United States v. Ross, 493 F.2d 771, 775 (5th Cir. 1974).
116. See Annot., supra note 96, at 335.
117. The court stated that the exclusion of the evidence of the prior guilty plea was
"compelled by the weight of reason and authority as well as considerations of basic fair-
ness in the trial process." 287 S.C. at 593, 340 S.E.2d at 540-41.
118. The concept of fairness permeates the doctrine of due process. Discussing due
process rights in a murder case, Chief Justice Ness quoted Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
165 (1952), as follows:
"Regard for the requirements of the Due Process Clause 'inescapably imposes
upon this Court an exercise of judgment upon the whole course of the proceed-
ings [resulting in a conviction] in order to ascertain whether they offend those
canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of English-
speaking peoples even toward those charged with the most heinous
19
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has also been some discussion in one United States Supreme
Court case that the admission of a prior guilty plea constitutes a
form of self-incrimination in violation of the fifth amendment,
119
but no decision actually has held as much.
The court's decision in Mathis established that South Caro-
lina, in conformity with a majority of other states, will not admit
evidence of a prior, withdrawn guilty plea in a later judicial pro-
ceeding. The decision is amply supported by authority and by
policy considerations favoring settlement of cases and fairness to
an individual accused of a crime.
John A. Cottingham
V. RIGHTS PROTECTED AGAINST IMPROPER PROSECUTORIAL
COMMENT EXPANDED
In State v. Brown'20 the South Carolina Supreme Court
again addressed the question of improper prosecutorial com-
ment.121 The court held that a prosecutor may not impair a de-
fendant's rights to appear pro se, to confront witnesses, and to
"put the State to its proof"'22 by using the assertion of those
rights as justification for greater punishment. In Brown the so-
licitor's cross-examination of the defendant during the sentenc-
ing phase of the trial tied the assertion of these rights to evi-
offenses.'. ...
Simmons v. State, 264 S.C. 417, 424-25, 215 S.E.2d 883, 886 (1975)(Ness, J., dissent-
ing)(quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952)). The Minnesota Supreme Court
has used similar reasoning. See State v. Reardon, 245 Minn. 509, 73 N.W.2d 192 (1955).
119. Canizio v. New York, 327 U.S. 82 (1946) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
120. 289 S.C. 581, 347 S.E.2d 882 (1986). In addition to the holding discussed in this
article, the court found that the defendant had knowingly and intelligently waived his
right to counsel and that the warrantless search of the motel room and seizure of items
from the room were improper. The admission of the improperly seized evidence was re-
versible error.
121. This topic has been litigated frequently in South Carolina courts. See, e.g.,
State v. Middleton, 288 S.C. 21, 339 S.E.2d 692 (1986) (improper for solicitor to elicit
from witness a statement that defendant failed to comment on robbery when questioned
by police; improper for solicitor to compound the error by repeating the answer);
Thompson v. Aiken, 281 S.C. 239, 315 S.E.2d 110 (1984) (improper to introduce arbitrary
factors into jury deliberations); State v. Sloan, 278 S.C. 435, 298 S.E.2d 92 (1982) (im-
proper to indicate that plea of not guilty indicates lack of remorse; improper to imply
defense attorney does not believe defendant is innocent; improper to comment on de-
fendant's refusal to talk to State's psychiatrist).
122. 289 S.C. at 590, 347 S.E.2d at 887 (citing Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609
(1965)).
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dence of lack of remorse.
Numerous federal and state cases have recognized that a
prosecutor may not suggest that a defendant's assertion of his
fifth amendment right to silence implies guilt. 23 In State v.
Sloan 2 4 the South Carolina Supreme Court extended the pro-
tections previously afforded the right to silence to the right to
plead not guilty. In Sloan the court held that a defendant's as-
sertion of his right to plead not guilty may not be used as evi-
dence of lack of remorse.125 Brown expanded the Sloan holding
by identifying more rights which are impermissibly impaired
when a solicitor uses the assertion of those rights as evidence of
lack of remorse.
In Brown the defendant pleaded not guilty to several
charges including murder. Brown maintained his innocence, but
claimed he was unable to recall what had happened on the day
the crimes were committed. 2 s He claimed his heavy use of drugs
had induced amnesia. 27 Brown represented himself at trial. He
neither testified nor called witnesses during the guilt phase. He
did, however, cross-examine the prosecution's witnesses. 12s The
jury found Brown guilty in the bifurcated trial. 29
During the sentencing phase of trial Brown presented a
sworn statement in which he said he was sorry if he had commit-
ted the crime. 30 He repeated, however, his claim of amnesia.' 31
123. See, e.g., Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) (use of defendant's post-Miranda
warning silence for impeachment purposes violates due process); Griffin v. California, 380
U.S. 609 (1965) (comment on defendant's failure to testify at trial violates his fifth
amendment right against self-incrimination); State v. Goolsby, 275 S.C. 110, 268 S.E.2d
31, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1037 (1980) (prosecutor may not comment to the jury on the
defendant's failure to take the stand); see also 3 W. LAFAVE & F. MAITLAND, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 23.4, at 29 (1984) (comment on defendant's assertion of his right to silence
improper); Vess, Walking a Tightrope: A Survey of Limitations on the Prosecutor's
Closing Argument, 64 J. CRIm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 22, 35-36 (1973); 21A Am. Ju. 2D Crim-
inal Law § 705 (1981) (comment on accused's failure to testify); Id. § 940 (improperly
placing a defendant in a position in which he must testify to avoid adverse inference
violates his privilege against self-incrimination).
124. 278 S.C. 435, 298 S.E.2d 92 (1982).
125. Interestingly, the court in Sloan cited no authority in extending this protec-
tion. Id. at 440, 298 S.E.2d at 94-95.
126. Brief of Respondent at 129-30.
127. Id.
128. 289 S.C. at 589, 347 S.E.2d at 886.
129. Id.
130. 289 S.C. 589, 347 S.E.2d at 886; Brief of Respondent at 130-31.
131. Brief of Respondent at 130-31.
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The solicitor, on cross-examination, pointed out that Brown had
represented himself at trial and had done an able job of cross-
examining the State's witnesses.132 The solicitor summed up his
cross examination by asking, "You weren't sorry then were
you?"133
In concluding that these comments violated due process, the
court cited United States Supreme Court authority for the pro-
positions that Brown had a right to appear pro se and to con-
front witnesses.134 The court presented both South Carolina1 35
and United States Supreme Court 136 authority supporting the
defendant's right to "put the State to its proof.'' 7 The court
then noted that the prosecution may not base an argument for
guilt or greater punishment on the defendant's assertion of a
constitutional right.138 Last, the court found the comments at is-
sue in Brown "equally egregious" to those in Sloan.139
While the Brown holding seems consistent with prior exten-
sions of constitutional protection to the right to plead guilty and
the right to silence, the ruling is nonetheless unusual. 40 Al-
though calling a defendant "doubly vicious because he de-
manded his full constitutional rights" has been held to violate
due process,' the vast majority of case law and commentary
dealing with improper prosecutorial comment focuses on fifth
amendment rights. 142 As noted above, the court in Brown cited
132. 289 S.C. at 589, 347 S.E.2d at 886-87.
133. Id., 347 S.E.2d at 889.
134. Id. at 589-90, 347 S.E.2d at 887. The court cited Faretta v. California, 422 U.S.
806 (1975) and Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) for these propositions.
135. State v. Adams, 277 S.C. 115, 283 S.E.2d 582 (1981).
136. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
137. 289 S.C. at 590, 347 S.E.2d at 887.
138. Id. The court cited Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) (comment on post-Mi-
randa warning silence violates due process because it breaches implied promise); Griffin
v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (comment on failure to testify violates fifth amendment
right against self incrimination); State v. Goolsby, 275 S.C. 110, 268 S.E.2d 31, cert. de-
nied, 449 U.S. 1037 (1980) (comment on failure to testify improper).
139. 289 S.C. at 590, 347 S.E.2d at 887.
140. Only one case appears to have reached a similar holding. See Hawkins v. State,
613 S.W.2d 720 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 919 (1981)(defendant's right to
appear pro se was violated when the prosecutor solicited negative comments from a psy-
chiatrist regarding defendant's demeanor while conducting his defense, at least where
competency was not an issue).
141. United States v. Hughes, 389 F.2d 535, 536 (2d Cir. 1968); see Alschuler, Court-
room Misconduct by Prosecutors and Trial Judges, 50 TEx. L. REv. 629, 642 (1972).
142. See sources cited supra note 123; see also Wainwright v. Greenfield, - U.S. _
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only cases involving directly or indirectly the right to silence.
The United States Supreme Court has, however, distinguished
between comments that impair specific constitutional rights and
those that generally violate due process, giving the former
greater protection.
143
The court stated in Brown that the defendant has a right to
"put the State to its proof,"' 44 but the court's choice of authori-
ties to cite for that proposition confused the meaning of the
phrase. The court, for example, cited Griffin v. California, a fed-
eral case which involved a defendant's right to remain silent and
which focused on the presumption of innocence. 145 State v. Ad-
ams,146 a state case cited in Brown, however, involved a prosecu-
tor who tricked a defendant into recommending his own death
penalty. The latter proceeding was held improper because it in-
troduced an arbitrary factor into the death penalty decision. 147
Why the court did not cite Sloan for the proposition that a de-
fendant has a right to put the State to its proof is unclear, since
Sloan refers to the "right of an accused to plead not guilty and
put the State to its proof."'
48
A recent United States Supreme Court decision may have
an interesting interplay with the holding in Brown. In Wain-
wright v. Greenfield the United States Supreme Court held that
a prosecutor may not use a defendant's assertion of his right to
silence and his right to request an attorney after Miranda warn-
106 S.Ct. 640 (1986)(comment on assertion of right to silence and request for attorney as
evidence of sanity violates due process). One commentator stated that it has been held
improper to point out that a defendant is appearing pro se, but gave no authority for
this proposition. Vess, supra note 123, at 38.
143. See Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974). In Donnelly the Court de-
nied the defendant's claim of a due process violation. The Court observed the following:
When specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights are involved, this Court has
taken special care to assure that prosecutorial conduct in no way impermissibly
infringes them. But here the claim is only that a prosecutor's remark about
respondent's expectations at trial by itself so infected the trial with unfairness
as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.
Id. at 643; see also Annotation, Supreme Court's Views as to What Courtroom State-
ments Made By Prosecuting Attorney During Criminal Trial Violate Due Process or
Constitute Denial of Fair Trial, 40 L. ED. 886, 893-95 (1974).
144. 289 S.C. at 590, 347 S.E.2d at 887.
145. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
146. 277 S.C. 115, 283 S.E.2d 582 (1981).
147. Id. at 120, 283 S.E.2d at 585.
148. 278 S.C. 435, 440, 298 S.E.2d 92, 95 (1982).
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ings have been given to undercut the defendant's claim of in-
sanity.148 Wainwright indicates that lack of remorse is not the
only impermissible inference from the assertion of a constitu-
tional right. Wainwright, like Doyle v. Ohio,150 seems to focus on
the general unfairness of breaching the promise implicit in the
Miranda warnings rather than on the substantive right itself.
Taken together, Brown and Wainwright raise questions re-
garding what comment would be proper when a defendant rep-
resents himself. Could the solicitor, for example, point out that a
defendant who pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity and who
asserted his right to appear pro se was probably not insane if he
did an able job of conducting his defense? Perhaps the questions
would have to be tailored to avoid direct comment on the pro se
appearance of the defendant. On the other hand, Wainwright
might simply be distinguished in such a case because of the
unique promise implied in the Miranda warnings that the asser-
tion of the right 'will not be used against the defendant in any
way.1
51
Virginia L. Vroegop
VI. DEFENDANT'S STATEMENTS IN DOCTOR'S EXAMINATION NOT
ADMISSIBLE UNLESS MIRANDA WARNINGS ISSUED
In State v. Caulder1 52 the South Carolina Court of Appeals
found a doctor's physical examination of a suspect which was
conducted pursuant to a search warrant and in a police station
to be a custodial interrogation. The court also found the doctor's
testimony about what Danny Caulder, the appellant, told him
during the examination concerning his injuries to be incriminat-
ing. Thus, the court held that the doctor's testimony should not
have been admissible since Caulder was not given his Miranda
warnings immediately prior to the examination. The Caulder
ruling was very fact specific, but could have a considerable effect
149. - U.S. at -, 106 S.Ct. at 640. Although the Court referred briefly to defend-
ant's request for an attorney, the focus of the case is on the violation of his right to due
process through the breach of an implied promise rather than on the impairment of any
specific constitutional guarantee. Wainwright, therefore, does not appear to be an exten-
sion of the protections afforded the right to an attorney.
150. 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
151. See - U.S. at -, 106 S.Ct. at 640.
152. 287 S.C. 507, 339 S.E.2d 876 (Ct. App. 1986).
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on when Miranda warnings must be given before a doctor per-
forms a physical examination on a suspect.
In Caulder the trial jury convicted Caulder of murder and
criminal sexual conduct. The verdict was based on mostly cir-
cumstantial evidence. 153 On appeal the appellant raised a variety
of issues.15 4 The court of appeals, although dismissing a number
of the appellant's assertions, reversed the conviction because of
the circumstantial nature of the State's case, the improper ad-
mission of the appellant's statement to the doctor, and an error
in the judge's charge.
Police discovered the body of Jean Iriel on September 11,
1982. Responding to police inquiries, Caulder went to the Sher-
iff's Department on September 14, with his attorney, and made
a statement concerning his whereabouts at the estimated time of
the murder. Prior to interrogation, the police advised Caulder of
his Miranda rights. Caulder signed a written acknowledgement
of his rights but did not answer any questions. On the following
afternoon the police arrested Caulder and again advised him of
his Miranda rights. An hour later the police advised him of his
rights for the third time, booked him, and placed him in a cell.
During the booking process the officers noticed scratches on
Caulder's chest and obtained a search warrant to conduct a
physical examination of him.155 Two and one-half hours later Dr.
Calvert conducted the physical examination, without repeating
the Miranda warnings, in the presence of the assistant solicitor,
the chief investigating police officer and another officer.' 6 Dr.
Calvert testified at trial that Caulder told him during the exami-
nation that the cuts and scratches on his hands and arms were
153. The evidence included suspicious items found in Caulder's stepfather's trailer,
testimony of two eyewitnesses that Caulder and the deceased left a club together at
about the time of her death, testimony from a jail informant that Caulder had confided
in the informant that Caulder had gotten away with murder, and evidence that Caulder
was a member of the broad class of potential depositors of semen found in the deceased's
body. Id. at 510-11, 339 S.E.2d at 878.
154. Caulder raised issues regarding the following: (1) Denial of his right to confront
and cross-examine witnesses; (2) denial of his right to call a witness; (3) failure to charge
the jury on certain propositions of law; (4) denial of his right to counsel; and (5) denial of
his right against self-incrimination. Id. at 509, 515, 339 S.E.2d at 878, 881.
155. According to the search warrant obtained by the State, the purpose of the
search "was to discover any 'evidence of a physical struggle.'" Id. at 515, 339 S.E.2d at
881.
156. Appellant's counsel was not present for the examination and there is no indica-
tion that any effort was made to notify him of it. Reply Brief of Appellant at 4.
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from work, but that Caulder said he did not know how he had
gotten the cut on his chest. Caulder testified in his defense that
the doctor only asked him how he got the scratches collectively,
and that he told the doctor he had gotten them at work. Caulder
did not recall answering a question specifically about the cut on
his chest. The solicitor emphasized Dr. Calvert's testimony con-
cerning the chest wound both on cross-examination of the appel-
lant and in his closing statement to the jury.
On appeal Caulder asserted that the admission of the doc-
tor's testimony violated both his fifth amendment right against
self-incrimination and his sixth amendment right to counsel.
The State, however, made the following arguments: (1) No cus-
todial interrogation occurred; (2) Caulder's statements to Dr.
Calvert were not incriminating; (3) Miranda warnings given to
Caulder some two and one-half hours before the questioning ob-
viated the need for additional warnings during the doctor's ques-
tioning; (4) Caulder waived his right to remain silent by not ob-
jecting to the questions; and (5) the error, if any, of admitting
the statement was harmless.15
The court perfunctorily dismissed the State's contentions.
The court found that Caulder was clearly in custody.158 The
State then attempted to argue that Miranda requirements still
were not required because Dr. Calvert had no prosecutorial mo-
tive when he inquired about the scratches. The court, using the
definition of interrogation as stated by the Supreme Court in
Rhode Island v. Innis,159 concluded, however, that the examina-
tion was an interrogation.
The court then cited Estelle v. Smith °60 and State v.
157. 287 S.C. at 515, 339 S.E.2d at 881.
158. The court cited State v. Doby, 273 S.C. 704, 258 S.E.2d 896 (1979), for the
proposition that a person is in custody when there has been a restriction on the person's
freedom. 287 S.C. at 515, 339 S.E.2d at 881. Here a search warrant had been obtained
and the examination took place in the presence of the assistant solicitor and two police
officers.
159. 446 U.S. 291 (1980). The Supreme Court in Innis stated as follows:
[T]he Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is sub-
jected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent. That is to say,
the term "interrogation" under Miranda refers not only to express questioning,
but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those
normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are rea-
sonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.
446 U.S. at 300-01 (footnotes omitted).
160. 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
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Woomer'61 for the proposition that a medical doctor's questions
are not immunized from Miranda scrutiny. Estelle and Woomer,
however, both dealt with psychological examinations, as do all
previous South Carolina cases which cite Estelle for this particu-
lar proposition. 16 2 Furthermore, while other jurisdictions have
cited Estelle, it appears that no courts in the Fourth Circuit
have used Estelle for the proposition that a medical doctor who
conducts a physical exam must first issue Miranda warnings.
1 63
The court, in concluding its analysis, held that Caulder's
statements were incriminating simply because they were used
against him at trial and that the State could not sustain its bur-
den of showing that Caulder intelligently waived his right to
counsel and to remain silent.' After deciding that the testi-
mony should not have been allowed, the court held that this er-
ror, coupled with an improper charge to the jury'6 5 and the cir-
cumstantial nature of the State's case, prevented a conclusion
beyond a reasonable doubt that the trial errors did not influence
the jury's verdict. Therefore, it reversed and remanded the case.
161. 278 S.C. 468, 299 S.E.2d 317 (1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1229 (1983).
162. See State v. Chaffee, 285 S.C. 21, 328 S.E.2d 464 (1984); State v. Koon, 278
S.C. 528, 298 S.E.2d 769 (1982); State v. Woomer, 278 S.C. 468, 299 S.E.2d 317 (1982),
cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1229 (1983).
163. For examples of when Estelle is cited, see State v. Jackson, 77 N.C. App. 491,
335 S.E.2d 903 (1985); Thomas v. State, 301 Md. 294, 483 A.2d 6 (1984), cert. denied,
sub. nom. Thomas v. Maryland, 470 U.S. 1088 (1985); State v. Jackson, 298 S.E.2d 866
(W. Va. 1982).
164. The State has the burden of proving that an accused's statements were volun-
tarily made. State v. Scott, 269 S.C. 438, 446, 237 S.E.2d 886, 890 (1977).
165. The court in this case also addressed State v. Copeland, 278 S.C. 572, 300
S.E.2d 63 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1103 (1983), in which the supreme court adopted
a rule allowing testimony of prior inconsistent statements to be used as substantive evi-
dence when the declarant testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination. In
Caulder a prison informant, Ross, testified that Caulder had told him that he thought he
had gotten away with killing Iriel. On cross-examination Ross admitted that he had told
a police officer that he heard someone else confess to the murder. Ross then testified,
however, that the person had confessed to the crimes after reading about them in the
newspaper. Following this testimony, Caulder's attorney introduced a taped conversation
in which Ross said the confession was made two days before the news was published.
The trial judge charged the jury that this prior inconsistent statement should be used for
impeachment purposes only. On appeal the State tried to distinguish Copeland by stat-
ing that in Copeland the witness himself made the inconsistent statements, but that in
Caulder the person who made the admission to the informant was not before the court.
The court of appeals rejected the distinction and held that the trial judge's charge was
erroneous. The court emphasized that the inconsistency was not in the content of the
admission, but in when Ross claimed he heard the statement. 287 S.C. at 513, 339 S.E.2d
at 880.
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The impact this case will have on the status of Miranda
warnings is difficult to define. At a minimum, Caulder adds
medical doctors conducting physical exams to the list of people
who can qualify as state agents for the purpose of determining
whether Miranda rights need to be given."' 6 An attempt could
be made, however, to use this case to expand greatly the situa-
tions in which Miranda warnings are required and to place a
heavier burden on doctors to give warnings before they ask stan-
dard examination questions. Based on the facts of Caulder, how-
ever, the holding seems to be a logical extension of Estelle and
Woomer and the actual effect of the holding on the rights of
suspects and the obligations of doctors probably will be
insignificant.
Augustus M. Dixon
VII. ALIBI EVIDENCE ADMISSIBLE IN SENTENCING HEARING IN
CAPITAL CASE
In State v. Stewart17 the South Carolina Supreme Court
broadened the scope of evidentiary presentation during the sen-
tencing phase of a capital case. Stewart was convicted of murder
and sentenced to death.168 On appeal the supreme court affirmed
the conviction, but vacated the death sentence and remanded
the case for a new sentencing hearing. 16 After a second sentenc-
ing hearing and on the second appeal, the supreme court held
for the first time that any evidence properly put into evidence
during either the guilt or sentencing phase of a trial is also ad-
missible in a resentencing hearing.
1 70
On remand from the initial appeal the trial court ruled that
section 16-3-25(E)(2) of the South Carolina Code171 limits evi-
dence admissible in a sentencing hearing to matters in aggrava-
166. For an example of such a list, see Marrs v. State, 53 Md. App. 230, 452 A.2d
992 (1982).
167. 288 S.C. 232, 341 S.E.2d 789 (1986).
168. Brief of Appellant at 31.
169. 283 S.C. 104, 320 S.E.2d 447 (1984).
170. 288 S.C. at 234-35, 341 S.E.2d at 790.
171. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-25(E)(2) (Law. Co-op. 1985) provides in part: "[T]he
new [resentencing] jury ... shall hear evidence in extenuation, mitigation, or aggrava-
tion of the punishment in addition to any evidence admitted in the defendant's first trial
relating to guilt for the particular crime for which the defendant has been found guilty."
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tion or mitigation of the crime. The trial court thus did not per-
mit Stewart to present to the resentencing jury evidence or
arguments solely intended to show his innocence.17 1 Stewart,
however, could introduce any evidence of mitigation even if that
evidence also related to the guilt phase of the trial.17 3
In compliance with this pretrial ruling, Stewart did not at-
tempt to introduce alibi evidence at the resentencing hearing al-
though he had introduced this evidence in the guilt phase of the
trial to demonstrate his innocence. The prosecution, however,
reintroduced most of the State's evidence previously admitted to
prove Stewart's guilt.174 The trial court again imposed a death
sentence, and the defendant appealed to the state supreme
court.17 5 The trial court's ruling that Stewart's alibi evidence was
not admissible at the resentencing hearing formed the basis of
the appeal.
The South Carolina Supreme Court held on appeal that the
resentencing court erred in excluding evidence which tended to
establish an alibi defense.'7 6 The supreme court based its finding
of trial court error on a construction of section 16-3-25(E)(2) of
the South Carolina Code and on an application of the safeguards
provided by the eighth amendment of the United States Consti-
tution as enunciated in Lockett v. Ohio'7 7 and Eddings v.
Oklahoma.'1
7
The court in Stewart applied what appears to be the clear
meaning of section 16-3-25(E)(2). According to the court, the
"any evidence" language of the statute means the sentencing
court should admit all evidence that could have an impact suffi-
cient to influence a jury to recommend life in prison rather than
the death penalty.17 The court further noted that this construc-
tion of the statute was consistent with the constitutional re-
quirement of Lockett and Eddings. 80
172. 288 S.C. at 233, 341 S.E.2d at 789.
173. Id., 341 S.E.2d at 790.
174. Id.
175. Id., 341 S.E.2d at 789.
176. Id.
177. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
178. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
179. 288 S.C. at 234, 341 S.E.2d at 790.
180. Id. In Lockett, the Supreme Court held that the sentencing body in a capital
case should "not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, . . . any of the
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less
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The supreme court tacitly recognized that a jury in a capital
case draws from the entire judicial proceeding in determining
the sentence. If a resentencing court precludes the jury from
hearing evidence which might have led the jury to impose a
lesser penalty, the proceeding is fundamentally unfair. This rec-
ognition of compromise verdicts,"'1 albeit tacit, is the only
means by which a court can ensure that a resentencing hearing
itself does not further prejudice the defendant.
Modern death penalty statutes grant the prosecution wide
discretion in determining what evidence a jury should hear in
the sentencing hearing.182 This discretion is allowed under the
theory that the jury should hear all of the surrounding circum-
stances prior to imposition of a sentence.8 3 Since the advent of
these modern statutes, some have sought to place the defense on
more equal footing with the prosecution. The Stewart case is a
clear step towards affording the defendant in a capital case
every opportunity of avoiding a death sentence.
The importance of State v. Stewart is also evident in light
of the ruling by the United States Supreme Court in Skipper v.
South Carolina.18 4 In Skipper, during the sentencing phase of
the trial, the defendant attempted to introduce the testimony of
two jailers and one regular visitor to the jail. These witnesses
were to testify that the petitioner had "made a good adjust-
ment" during his incarceration."8 5 On appeal the Supreme Court
reversed the decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court to
exclude the testimony and held instead that the trial court's ex-
clusion of this testimony from the sentencing hearing denied the
petitioner his right to place before the sentencing jury all rele-
vant and mitigating evidence.""
than death." 438 U.S. at 604 (emphasis in original). The Court based this holding on its
conclusion that when the choice is between life and death, the eighth amendment bars
any sentencing procedure which "creates the risk that the death penalty will be imposed
in spite of factors that call for a less severe penalty." Id. at 605.
131. The term "compromise verdict" refers to a jury's tendency to avoid the imposi-
tion of the death penalty when there may be some degree of doubt, however small, as to
the defendant's guilt.
182. See, e.g., S.C. CoDE ANN. § 16-3-20 (Law. Co-op. 1985).
183. See generally Patterson v. South Carolina, 471 U.S. 1036 (1985); State v. Koon,
278 S.C. 528, 298 S.E.2d 769 (1982).
184. - U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 1669 (1986).
185. Id. at -, 106 S.Ct. at 1670.
186. Id. at .,106 S.Ct. at 1669.
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Several capital cases are now on appeal to the United States
Supreme Court from South Carolina. Skipper will affect those
cases involving the exclusion of evidence in the resentencing
phase of the trial. As the affected cases are remanded to the
state courts, the defendants will have new protections under the
broad holding of State v. Stewart.
James R. Courie
31
Courie: Criminal Law
Published by Scholar Commons, 1987
32
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 1 [1987], Art. 4
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol39/iss1/4
